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ANN B. HOPKINS, 
Respondent. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT' ADVISORY COUNCIL 
IN THE SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONER 
The Equal Employment Advisory Council 
("EEAC") respectfully submits this brief amicus 
curiae in support of the Petitioner. The written con-
sents of all parties have been filed with the Clerk of 
this Court. 
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 
EEAC is a nationwide association of employers 
and trade associations organized in 1976 to promote 
sound approaches to the elimination of discriminatory 
employment practices. Its membership comprises a 
broad segment of the business community. Its gov-
2 
erning body is a Board of Directors composed of ex-
perts and specialists in equal employment opportun-
ity. Their combined experience gives the Council an 
unmatched depth of knowledge of the practical as 
well as the legal aspects of equal employment oppor-
tunity programs and requirements. The members of 
EEAC are firmly committed to the principles of non-
discrimination and equal employment opportunity. 
All of EEAC's members, and the constituents of 
its trade association members, are employers subject 
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 621 et seq., as well as other equal employment stat-
utes and regulations. As employers, and as potential 
respondents to charges of discrimination pursuant to 
Title VII and the ADEA, EEAC's members have a 
strong interest in the issues presented here. 
In this case, the district court found that there 
were legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonpretextual 
reasons for the employment decision, and also that 
there was no showing by the plaintiff that assertedly 
sexually stereotypical statements played a causal role 
in the plaintiff's failure to be made a partner. The 
court of appeals, however, shifted the burden to the 
employer to prove by "clear and convincing" evidence 
that the unlawful factor was not the determinative 
one. This burden of proof is out of step with pre-
vious decisions of this Court holding that the burden 
of proof remains at all times with the plaintiff in a 
disparate treatment case. In addition, the use of the 
"clear and convincing" standard below was erron-
eous and contrary to previous decisions of this Court 




Affirmance of the standards applied below would 
improperly shift the burden in Title VII, ADEA and 
other employment-related actions . 
Because of its interest in the application of the 
nation's civil rights laws, EEAC has filed over 230 
briefs as amicus curiae in cases before the United 
States Supreme Court, the United States Circuit 
Courts of Appeals and various state supreme courts. 
As part of this amicus activity, EEAC has partici-
pated in several cases involving the burden of proof 
in discrimination cases, including Texas Department 
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 
(1981); Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 
U.S. 567 (1978); United States Postal Service Board 
of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Con-
necticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) and Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324 ( 1977). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff in this case was a senior manager who 
was informed that she would not be selected as a 
partner by Price Waterhouse. The decision not to 
select plaintiff as a partner came at the end of a 
comprehensive process. Price Waterhouse is one of 
the "big eight" accounting firms. When the trial 
began in this case, it had 662 partners working in 90 
offices around the country. (Pet. App. 3a) .1 Poten-
tial partners are nominated by a local office. The 
names and accompanying performance appraisals of 
all nominees are circulated to all partners, who are 
invited to comment on candidates. (Pet. App. 5a). 
1 "Pet. App." references are to the appendix to the petition 
for certiorari. 
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Long or short form evaluations are filled out, depend-
ing on the degree of knowledge of the candidate. All 
nominees are ranked against other recent partner-
ship candidates in 48 categories. (Pet. App. 41a). 
Recommendations for partnership are made to the 
Policy Board by its Admissions Committee. The 
Board then votes on which candidates are to be in-
cluded on the partnership ballot. A partnership-wide 
election then is held. Those not placed on the ballot 
are informed of the Board's reasons for rejecting or 
postponing their candidacies. ( Pet. App. 5a). 
The district court below found that: 
Because the plaintiff had considerable problems 
dealing with staff and peers, the Court cannot 
say that she would have been elected to partner-
ship if the Policy Board's decision had not been 
tainted by sexually biased evaluations. Even 
supporters of the plaintiff viewed her style as 
somewhat offensive and detrimental to her effec-
tiveness as a manager. 
(Pet. App. 59a). One fourth of the thirty-two part-
ners who evaluated the plaintiff opposed her admis-
sion. (Pet. App. 6a) . Three others recommended 
that she be held for reconsideration; and eight said 
they had insufficient information to form an opinion. 
(Id.). 
The district court found that " [ m] any of the com-
ments from evaluating partners centered on Hopkins' 
apparent difficulties with staff, and both supporters 
and opponents of her candidacy characterized her as 
sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, impatient 
with staff and very demanding." (Id.) . Indeed, 
plaintiff had been counseled about these shortcom-
" ' 
5 
ings and indicated "that she agreed with many of 
these criticisms." ( Pet. A pp. 46a) . 
On the other hand, the district court stated that 
Hopkins was "qualified for partnership considera-
tion", as she was "exceptionally successful in gar-
nering business for the firm." (Pet. App. 4a). In 
addition, there were a number of negative comments 
that the courts below found were sex-related. For ex-
ample, statements were made suggesting she needed a 
course in "charm school", that she may "have over-
compensated for being a woman", or that she used 
profanity. (Pet. App. 6a). Other examples of al-
legedly discriminatory statements are set out in the 
decisions below. 
In evaluating plaintiff's arguments that the deci-
sion to deny her partnership was discriminatory, the 
district court held: "that the complaints about the 
plaintiff's interpersonal skills were not fabricated as 
a pretext for discrmination" (Pet. App. 46a-48a); 
and that "Price Waterhouse had legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons for distinguishing between the 
plaintiff and the male partners with whom she com-
pares herself" ( Pet. App. at 48a). Nevertheless, the 
district court found that sex-related comments were 
made about plaintiff, relying on the testimony of an 
"expert" in stereotyping who "did not purport to be 
able to determine whether or not any particular re-
action was determined by the operation of sex stereo-
types." (Pet. App. 53a) ( emphasis added). 
The Court then found : 
[WJ hile stereotyping played an undefined role in 
blocking plaintiff's admission to the partnership 
in this instance, it was unconscious on the part of 
6 
the partners who submitted comments. The 
comments of the individual partners and the ex-
pert evidence of Dr. Fiske do not prove an inten-
tional discriminatory motive or purpose. 
( Pet. App. 54a) ( emphasis added). 
But the district court also stated that although this 
stereotyping may have been unconscious, Price Water-
house maintained a system that gave weight to such 
criticism. Thus, the court held that the plaintiff was 
the victim of "omissive and subtle" discrimination. 
( Pet. A pp. 56a). Stating that there was a "mixture 
of legitimate and discriminatory considerations," the 
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to relief 
"unless the employer has demonstrated by clear and 
convincing evidence that the decision would have been 
the same absent discrimination." Pet. App. 59a. 
The "clear and convincing" burden placed on the 
employer by the district court was affirmed by the 
court of appeals. The court of appeals noted that 
the "courts have struggled to resolve the difficult 
questions of causation that arise in mixed-motive 
cases such as this." ( Pet. A pp. 22a) . 
2 It then re-
viewed the confusion in the court of appeals decisions. 
(Pet. App. 20a-24a).3 It held that when the plaintiff 
12 In its brief to this Court, Price Waterhouse properly dis-
putes the characterizations of the courts below that this is a 
"mixed motive" case, as did Judge Williams' dissent, discussed 
below. The Amicus strongly concurs with those arguments. 
3 Indeed, as the petition for a writ of certiorari in this case 
shows, "the courts of appeals have devised no fewer than five 
inconsistent ways to resolve cases in which it is argued that 
the defendant acted on the basis of both a lawful and an 




has shown that impermissible bias was a part of the 
employment decision: 
"We chose ... to place the !burden upon the em-
ployer to show, by 'clear and convincing evidence,' 
that the unlawful factor was not the determina-
tive one." 
Pet. App. 23a, citing Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 
1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original). It is 
this ruling that is addressed by this brief. 
In dissent, Judge Williams criticized the majority's 
reliance on assertedly stereotypical language in order 
to find a violation, stating that this "evidence of sex-
ual stereotyping is carefully culled from a mass of 
critical comments on the plaintiff's abrasiveness with 
no sex link whatever." Pet. App. 29a. The dissent 
stated that these negative comments about plaintiff's 
partnership qualifications were well founded in fact, 
represented standards applied to men and women 
alike, and were the true basis of the firm's decision. 
Pet. App. at 29a-30a. Applying the standards of 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 
450 U.S. 248 (1981), Judge Williams criticized the 
majority for improperly putting upon the defendant 
the burden of proving that its reasons were not pre-
textual. Pet. App. 30a. 
Further, in vivid contrast to the majority's reliance 
upon an "expert" in sex stereotyping who was not 
familiar with the specific facts of this case, Judge 
Williams examined in detail the effect this alleged 
stereotyping played in the partnership decision and 
determined that the record did not support the ma-
jority's conclusions. Pet. App. 31a-38a. 




Judge Williams also criticized the majority for 
calling this a "mixed motive" case as" 'discrimination 
has not been specifically attributed to the employment 
decision of which the plaintiff complains'", Pet. App. 
38a, citing Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1366 
(D.C. Cir. 1983). Since there was not enough evi-
dence to support a verdict for the plaintiff "under 
any established approach to Title VII liability," 
Judge Williams would not have found a violation. 
Pet. App. 38a-39a. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The decisions below improperly shifted the burden 
to the employer to prove by "clear and convincing" 
evidence that the unlawful factor was not the deter-
minative factor in plaintiff's failure to attain part-
nership. Under Title VII's language, the plaintiff 
must prove that she was adversely affected "because 
of" her sex-a finding which the district court specif-
ically found could not be made in this case. As the 
courts have recognized, employment decisions are 
complex, and an undeserving plaintiff should not pre-
vail merely because the record may reveal an instance 
of illegal motivation which the plaintiff cannot prove 
had a causal connection to the denial of a job oppor-
tunity. 
Thus, this Court has developed a "sensible, or-
derly" method of allocating the burden of proof. 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 
577 (1978). Even if the plaintiff can demonstrate 
that an illegal motive may he present, the employer 
can rebut this evidence with evidence that its decision 
was based upon legitimate considerations. At this 
point, the initial prima f acie presumption "drops 
.. 
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from the case," the district court is to examine all the 
facts developed at trial, and the "plaintiff retains the 
burden of ... persuading the court that a discrimina-
tory reason more likely motivated the employer ... " 
U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 
U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
248) ( emphasis added) . 
There are sound, practical reasons for allocating 
the proof in this manner. Often it can be shown that 
the person who made a discriminatory statement was 
not involved to a sufficient degree in the employment 
decision. La Montagne v. American Convenience 
Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1412-13 (7th Cir. 
1984). In other cases, the individual will lack the 
qualifications, or cannot show that there was an 
opening available for the position sought. Other 
times, as in the instant case, the employer's state-
ments cannot be shown to be pretextual, or the plain-
tiff cannot establish a causal connection between the 
alleged discrimination and the employer's conduct. 
This Court's decisions in Mt. Healthy City School 
District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), and 
National Labor Relations Board v. Transportation 
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) do not re-
quire a different result. Neither was a Title VII case 
nor involved a statutory scheme which bars relief 
unless the plaintiff can show that a employment bene-
fit was denied "because of" discrimination. Also, 
Transportation Management was based upon the fact 
that the NLRB viewed the employer's burden as es-
tablishing an "affirmative defense" ( 462 U.S. at 402-
03), a standard never used in allocating Title VII's 
evidentiary burdens. Finally, in any event, inasmuch 
as both Mt. Healthy and Transportation Manage-
10 
ment used the "preponderance of the evidence" stand-
ard, the unexplained use of the "clear and convinc-
ing" standard below cannot stand. 
ARGUMENT 
TO PREVAIL IN A TITLE VII "MIXEH MOTIVE" 
CASE', THE PLAINTIFF MUST DEMONSTRATE 
THAT THE DISCRIMINATORY MOTIVATION WAS 
THE DETERMINING ("BUT FOR") FACTOR IN THE 
CHALLENGED EMPLOYMENT DECISION. 
I. The Language Of Title VII Requires That To Establish 
Illegal Discrimination And To Receive Any Relief, The 
Plaintiff Must Prove The Employer's Action Was 
Taken "Because Of" The Plaintiff's Sex, Race Or Other 
Protected Characteristic. 
By placing the burden on the employer to prove 
by "clear and convincing" evidence that the unlawful 
factor was not the determinative factor in an employ-
ment decision, the courts below improperly shifted 
the Title VII burden of proof onto the employer and 
ignored established precedent rejecting the clear and 
convincing standard. 
In order to prevail in a Title VII case, the plain-
tiff must prove that the employment decision was 
caused by illegal discrimination. Section 703 (a) of 
Title VII prohibits discrimination against an indi-
vidual "because of" that person's race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin.4 See McQuillen v. Wisconsin 
4 The full text of Section 703 (a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000-e-2 (a) 
( 1982) states as follows : 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
' 
11 
Education Association Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664 
(7th Cir. 1987). Additionally, proof of causation is 
required by Title VII's remedial provision. Section 
706 (g), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5 (g), forbids the courts 
from giving relief (such as hiring, reinstatement, 
promotion, or back pay), if that individual was re-
fused employment, advancement or was suspended 
or discharged "for any reason other than discrimina-
tion." 
Obviously, in some cases the evidence of an em-
ployer's discriminatory animus may be so strong as 
to "effectively preclude an employer from contending 
that the same decision would have been made regard-
less of the employer's motivation." See Bl,alock v. 
Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 
1985). In many instances, like the instant case, how-
ever, there may be many reasons for an employment 
decision. Thus, 
employment decisions are often complex, and, 
where dozens of factors are involved in evalua-
tion of an employee, the fact that one such fac-
tor is impermissible does not necessarily pre-
clude the contention that the adverse employ-
ment action would have been taken regardless of 
the impermissible factor. 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as 
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin. 
( Emphasis added.) 
12 
B"lalock, 775 F.2d at 712. See also Bibbs v. 
Block, 
778 F.2d 1318, 1330-32 (8th Cir. 1985) (Ross, 
J., dis-
senting), in which Judge Ross discusses in det
ail the 
Title VII requirement that the plaintiff prov
e that 
the adverse action against the plaintiff was
 taken 
"because of" the discriminatory motive. 
Because of this statutory language, Title 
VII 
places the burden on the plaintiff to show tha
t some 
statutorily proscribed factor (such as race o
r sex) 
was a "but for" cause of the employer's co
nduct. 
M~cDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
 Com-
pany, 427 U.S. 273, 283 n.10 (1976). Furthe
r, the 
Court consistently has resisted attempts by pla
intiffs 
to shift the burden of proof in Title VII cases
 to the 
employer and has made clear that to prevail a
gainst 
the plaintiff's prima facie case, the employer 
is not 
required "to prove absence of discriminatory m
otive." 
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sw
eeney, 
439 U.S. 24, 24 (1978). 
The Court has developed "a sensible, orderly 
way 
to evaluate the evidence in light of common e
xperi-
ence as it bears on the critical question of discr
imina-
tion." Furnco Construction Corporation v. W
aters, 
438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). As the Court h
as ex-
plained, the specific requirements "necessaril
y will 
vary" with the facts of each case. McDonnell 
Doug-
l,as v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973). In
 addi-
tion, however, the ultimate burden of proving
 inten-
tional discrimination never shifts from the pla
intiff. 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bu
rdine, 
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Thus, once the em
ployer 
has explained its conduct, "the factual inquir
y pro-
ceeds to a new level of specificity," id., at 25
5, and 
the plaintiff's burden of proving pretext merge
s with 
the ultimate burden of proof. Id., at 256. 
) , 
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II. Even Assuming T'hat Discriminatory Motive Can Be 
Shown, Once The Employer Provides A Legitimate 
Nondiscriminatory Reason For Its Conduc4 The 
Plaintiff Must Prove By A Preponderance Of The Evi-
dence That The Misconduct Made A Difference In The 
Employer's Decision. 
As shown, a Title VII plaintiff may establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination either by direct 
evidence, or by the McDonnell Douglas construct per-
mitting an inference of intentional discrimination. 
The central focus of the inquiry is always whether 
"[t]he employer simply [is treating] some people 
less favorably than others because of their race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.'" Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 ( emphasis 
added). If the employer's actions remain unexplained, 
the presumption arises that they are "more likely 
than not based on the consideration of impermissible 
factors.'' Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. 
But rather than adopt hard-and-fast, inflexible 
requirements, the court has required a realistic ap-
plication of this legal formula. As explained in 
Furnco: 
[W]e know from our experience that more 
often than not people do not act in a totally ar-
bitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, 
especially in a business setting. Thus, when all 
legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant 
have been eliminated as possible reasons for the 
employer's actions, it is more likely than not the 
employer, who we generally assume acts only 
with some [emphasis in original] reason, based 
his decision on an impermissible consideration, 
such as race. 
438 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added)}5 
" As the Court has noted, "[Title Vil] was not intended to 
'diminish traditional management prerogatives.' " Burdine, 
14 
After the district court has tried the case and has 
all the evidence before it, this Court has cautioned 
against becoming bogged down in a mechanistic ap-
plication of the McDonnell Douglas standards and 
"unnecessarily evad[ing] the ultimate question of 
discrimination, vel non." See U.S. Postal Service Bd. 
of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983). 
Once the employer introduces evidence that it acted 
for "a" legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (Aik-
ens, 460 U.S. at 714), "'the factual inquiry proceeds 
to a new level of specificity.'" Id., at 715, citing Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. at 255. Aikens showed that, despite 
his qualifications, whites were promoted above him. 
In addition: "He introduced testimony that the per-
son responsible for the promotion decisions at issue 
ha,d made numerous derogatory comments about 
blacks in general and Aikens in particular." 460 U.S. 
at 714 n. 2 ( emphasis added). Thus, even in the face 
of apparently direct evidence of anti-black animus, 
this Court stated that the initial prima facie pre-
sumption of discrimination "drops from the case", 
460 U.S. at 715. 
Thus, with a full record before it, the district court 
should look at "all the evidence". 460 U.S. at 715. 
As in "other civil litigation," the court should decide 
"disputed" questions of fact. 460 U.S. at 715-16. 
"The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion 
. . . [HJ e may succeed in this either directly by 
persuading the court that a discriminatory rea-
son more likely motivated the employer or indir-
ectly by showing that the employer's proffered 
explanation is unworthy of credence." 
450 U.S. at 259 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 
207). See also, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 
206 (1979). 
15 
460 U.S. at 716, citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Ac-
cordingly, it is clear that even where direct proof of 
discriminatory intent has been shown, when the em-
ployer introduces evidence showing a legitimate rea-
son for its conduct, the plaintiff cannot prevail absent 
a showing that it was the discriminatory reason that 
"more likely motivated the employer." 6 The courts 
below thus were patently in error by placing the bur-
den on the employer to prove, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that the unlawful factor was not the 
determinative one. 
Moreover, there are important, practical reasons 
why a plaintiff who cannot meet this burden of prov-
ing causation should not be able to prevail merely by 
showing that someone in a supervisory capacity "har-
bored some discriminatory motivation." McQuillen 
v. Wisconsin Education Association Council, 830 
F.2d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1987). The employee also 
"must establish that the discriminatory motivation 
was a determining factor in the challenged employ-
ment decision in that the employee would have re-
ceived the job absent the discriminatory motivation." 
Id. 
6 This Court has rejected arguments that this places an im-
permissible burden on the plaintiff. As explained in Burdine, 
the employer's reasons must be "clear and reasonably specific." 
450 U.S. at 258. In addition, "the liberal discovery rules 
applicable to any civil suit in federal court are supplemented 
in a Title VII suit by the plaintiff's access to the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission's investigatory files con-
cerning her complaint." Id. at 258. Indeed, in the district 
court below, Judge Gesell stated : "In the course of this trial, 
Price Waterhouse has been very forthcoming in providing 
information on its partnership se[le]ction process." Pet. 
App. 49a. 
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For example, the courts have recognized that while 
the record in a particular case may establish that 
a statement was improperly race- or sex-based, it 
often can be shown that the person who made the 
statement was not involved to a sufficient degree in 
the decision at issue. See La Montagne v. American 
Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1412-13 
(7th Cir. 1984); Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665 
(1st Cir. 1979); and Lucy v. Manville Sales Corp., 
67 4 F. Supp. 1426 (D. Colo. 1987). Under these 
cases, the employee's failure to establish a "causal 
connection" between the alleged discriminatory con-
duct and the employer's action ultimately was suffi-
cient to defeat the discrimination claim also. In ad-
dition, there often will be overriding reasons that a 
person will not be given an employment opportunity, 
such as lack of qualifications, lack of openings, or 
other reason showing the individual would not have 
been hired. 
This case provides an apt example. Here, an ac-
counting firm of immense size had the difficult task of 
identifying and choosing who will be selected for 
partnership. Evaluations of a large number of can-
didates are done by a large number of existing part-
ners. While isolated improper statements allegedly 
were made, those statements should not be determina-
tive where there are overriding, legitimate reasons 
for not making the individual a firm partner. 
Partnership, of course, is much more than an or-
dinary employment relationship. Numerous subjec-
tive concerns necessarily are involved, such as pro-
fessional standing, outside activities, adequacy of 
billings, and contributions to the success and reputa-
tion of the firm. Cf. Hishon v. King &: Spaulding, 
467 U.S. 69, 79-81, and n.3 (1984) (Powell, J., con-
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curring). One of the most important factors is the 
ability to get along with other partners and members 
of the staff-the very concerns upon which Price 
Waterhouse determined not to make the plaintiff a 
partner. 
Here, the district court held that it could not say 
that she would have been selected for partnership if 
the Policy Board's decision had not been tainted by 
sexually biased evaluations. Pet. A pp. 59a. It also 
held that "[t]he comments of the individual partners 
and the expert evidence by Dr. Fiske do not prove 
an intentionally discriminatory motive or purpose." 
Pet. App. 54a. Judge Gesell further ruled that "the 
complaints about the plaintiff's interpersonal skills 
were not fabricated as a pretext for discrimination." 
Pet. App. 46a. Given those holdings, it was clear that 
the employer had met its burden of rebutting the 
plaintiff's prima facie case. Since the plaintiff failed 
to prove that she would have been chosen "but for" 
the alleged discriminatory conduct, the suit should 
have been dismissed.7 
7 The district court's reliance on so-called expert testimony 
of sex stereotyping is troublesome, inasmuch as Judge Gesell 
found that "Dr. Fiske did not purport to be able to determine 
whether or not any particular reaction was determined by the 
operation of sex stereotypes. However, she did identify com-
ments that she believed were influenced by sex stereotypes." 
Pet. App. 53a. (Emphasis added). The determination of 
whether race or sex played a part in a particular employment 
decision would seem to be the ultimate issue for the district 
court, and an inappropriate issue on which to allow a pur-
ported "expert" to express a belief, particularly in view of 
Dr. Fiske's failure to examine any of Price Waterhouse's 
partners or their particular reactions to Ms. Hopkins. 
Equally disturbing is the district court's apparent deference 
to technical research (Pet. App. 52a-53a and n.10). The dis-
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III. Mt. Healthy And Transportation Management Do Not 
Shift The Burden To The Employer In A Title VII 
''Mixed Motive" Case. In Any Event Those Decisions 
Only Impose A Burden To Prove By A "Preponder-
ance" Of The Evidence Rather Than By "Clear And 
Convincing" Evidence. 
The plaintiff's opposition to the writ of certiorari 
erroneously states that "the district court then fol-
lowed settled precedent and inquired whether Price 
Waterhouse had proved that Hopkins would have 
been rejected even in a bias-free setting. Mt. Healthy 
City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); 
National Labor Relations Board v. Transportation 
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983)." Op. 
cert. at 3. The plaintiff is wrong for at least three 
reasons. First, the district court did not even men-
tion those decisions. Second, those decisions are not 
applicable to Title VII cases. Third, both courts be-
low improperly imposed a "clear and convincing" 
standard in this civil litigation-a burden that is 
clearly at odds with the "preponderance" standard 
previously used by this Court in the Mt. Healthy line 
of cases. 
trict court came dangerously close to taking judicial notice of 
research opinion which was not subject to deposition, cross 
examination and the other rigours of trial. Inasmuch as 
"societal discrimination" is not sufficient for proof under Title 
VII (See generally, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 
106 S.Ct. 1842, 1847-49 (1986) (Opinion of Powell, J.)), use 
of generalized research opinion seems even more inappropri-
ate in a case where there has been such extensive discovery 
in the district court as to the specific employment decisions 
of a particular employer. A much more appropriate and valid 
analysis of the evidence of this particular case was under-
taken by Judge Williams in his dissenting opinion below. Pet. 
App. 28a-39a. 
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Neither Mt. Healthy (a constitutional case) nor 
Transportation Management ( a National Labor Re-
lations Act case) involved statutory language such 
as found in Title VII which imposes upon the plain-
tiff the burden of proving that the discrimination 
was "because of" the employer's discrimination. In-
deed, neither decision even discussed the language of 
Title VII upon which the Title VII statutory burden 
of proof scheme is based. 
As previously shown, this Court's Title VII cases, 
for good reason, have never moved the burden of 
proof to the employer. Instead, under Title VII, even 
if the plaintiff can establish some direct evidence of 
discriminatory motive, once the employer articulates 
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the initial 
prima facie presumption "drops from the case," 460 
U.S. at 715 ( quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, n.10) 
and the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion 
that "a discriminatory motive more likely motivated 
the employer." Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 ( quoting 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256) (emphasis added). This 
statutory difference by itself is sufficient to distin-
guish the Mt. Healthy line of cases. 
In addition, Transportation Management was 
grounded in large part upon the NLRB's construc-
tion of the National Labor Relations Act that the 
employer would have· an "affirmative defense" ( 462 
U.S. at 402-03) of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it would have reached the same decision 
even if it had not been motivated by an improper 
motivation. This Court has never construed the em-
ployer's Title VII burden as involving an "affirma-
tive defense". Thus Transportation Management is 
inapplicable to Title VIL Indeed, it was to correct a 
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similar error that this Court issued its per curiam 
decision in Board of Trustees of Keene St. College v. 
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) and made clear that 
the employer cannot be required to prove the ab-
sence of discriminatory motive. 
Further, Transportation Management held that the 
Court's Title VII Burdine decision was "inapposite", 
noting both that the plaintiff in Burdine bore the 
"ultimate burden" of persuading the trier of fact 
that the defendant committed discrimination, and 
that no illegal motivation was involved in Burdine. 
As shown above, the Court's Aikens decision clarified 
that the plaintiff's Title VII burden is to prove that 
the discriminatory motive "more likely" motivated 
the employer. 
What is relevant from Mt. Healthy is the Court's 
concern that an employee who engaged in protected 
constitutional conduct should not be reinstated if there 
were other legitimate reasons for not doing so, par-
ticularly in light of the "significant," "long-term 
consequences" of the tenure decision at issue in that 
case. 429 U.S. at 286. The Court reasoned in lift. 
Healthy that: "[t]he constitutional principle at 
stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is 
placed in no worse a position than if he had not en-
gaged in the conduct." 429 U.S. at 285-86. As the 
Court stated in language directly applicable to the 
plaintiff here: 
that same candidate ought not to be able, by en-
gaging in such [protected] conduct, to prevent 
his employer from assessing his performance 
record and reaching a decision not to rehire on 
the basis of that record. . . . 




Finally, in the event that the Court should find 
that its Mt. Healthy line of cases should be applied 
to Title VII, it then should reject the "clear and con-
vincing" standard applied by the courts below. 
Neither court offered any statutory or decisional au-
thority for their unusual holdings, apparently rely-
ing on mere ipse dixit to establish the employer's ul-
timate burden of proof. 
This Court consistently has held that a defendant 
may prevail if it can show "by a preponderance of 
the evidence that it would have reached the same 
decision as to respondent's reemployment even in the 
absence of the protected conduct." Mt. Healthy, 429 
U.S. at 287 (Emphasis added). The preponderance 
standard also was used in Transportation Manage-
ment (462 U.S. at 402), and Givhan v. Western Line 
Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 416 
(1979). 
It is hornbook law that the "preponderance of the 
evidence" standard is the standard to be used "on 
the general run of issues in civil cases .... " Mc-
Cormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, Second 
Ed., West Publishing Co., 1972, at p. 793. The "clear 
and convincing" standard is used only in "certain 
exceptional controversies" not applicable here. Id., at 
793, 796-98. And as the Court stated in Aikens, 
questions of fact in Title VII cases are to be decided 
"just as district courts decide disputed questions of 
fact in other civil litigation." 460 U.S. at 715-16. 8 
Accordingly, whichever party bears the ultimate bur-
den in this case, that burden may be met by satisfy-
ing the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. 
8 Accord, Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (No 
evidence "that civil rights claims were to be on any different 
footing from other civil claims ... "). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the decision below should 
be reversed. 
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